Materials and Methods 1
Participants face modified versions of an established experimental game modeling 2 intergroup conflict -the Intergroup Prisoner's Dilemma-Maximizing Difference (IPD-MD) 3 (De Dreu et al., 2010; Halevy et al., 2008 Halevy et al., , 2012 . In the IPD-MD, participants are randomly 4 assigned to one of two equal-sized groups. Each participant decides individually and 5 independently how to divide valuable endowment-points between three options: (1) Each 6 point KEPT in the personal account gives the individual a benefit of 1 point with no effect on 7 any other player. (2) Each point contributed to the WITHIN pool of the in-group credits every 8 in-group member with 0.5 points. Contribution to WITHIN has no negative consequences for 9 out-group members, hence indicating peaceful 'in-group love' and a disregard or even a 10 positive concern for the out-group's payoff. (3) Lastly, each point contributed to the 11 BETWEEN pool has the same positive consequences for the in-group as a point contributed 12
to WITHIN, but additionally reduces the payoff of each out-group member by 0.5. Thus, 13 contributing to BETWEEN again indicates 'in-group love' but now coupled with spiteful 14 'out-group hate', that is, the concern to minimize the out-group's absolute or relative payoff. 15
We contrast the classic IPD-MD game with a group size of n = 3 and an endowment of 16 e = 5 (see the Procedures section for details), in which all individuals in both groups decide 17 simultaneously and can therefore not be sure whether their actions are defensive or offensive, 18 (subsequently labeled SIM) with four other conditions utilizing a similar game structure, but 19 with groups playing sequentially (labeled SEQ). 20
Two of these conditions -SEQ-HATE and SEQ-LOVE -are designed to investigate 21 retaliatory 'out-group hate' ex post, that is, a response to an aggressive attack from another 22 group. In the SEQ-HATE condition, members of one group -the second-movers -23 simultaneously allocate points contingent on the number of points allocated to BETWEEN by 24 the opposing first-mover group, i.e., we use the so-called strategy vector method to elicit 25 Page 7 of 23 second-movers' complete contribution strategies (Selten, 1967 ; see the Procedures section for 1 details). Hence, in SEQ-HATE, second-movers are able to retaliate against potential attacks by 2 the first-movers and therefore avert a relative loss, which is common knowledge among both 3 first-and second-movers. In the control condition SEQ-LOVE, second-movers distribute their 4 points contingent on the first-movers' contributions to WITHIN. Here, in the absence of any 5 relative threat through the out-group, one may assume that second-movers' cooperation 6 (particularly 'in-group love') increases with a higher amount of contributions to WITHIN by 7 the out-group, as a form of peaceful competition via in-group cooperation (Böhm & 8 Rockenbach, 2013) . 9
Two additional conditions -SEQ-PREEMPTIVE-STRIKE and SEQ-SECURE-STRIKE 10 -aim to test whether the desire to defend the in-group can also cause an offensive display of 11 'out-group hate' ex ante. Such defense-motivated attacks are historically well documented, 12 e.g., the Israeli strike against Egyptian airfields in 1967. Moreover, there is recent evidence 13 that aggression between individuals increases if it serves to protect one's own self (Abbink & 14 de Haan, 2014; Simunovic, Mifune, & Yamagishi, 2013) , particularly when the interaction 15 partner is an out-group member (De Dreu et al., 2010) . In the SEQ-PREEMPTIVE-STRIKE 16 condition, first-movers can reduce the negative effect of second-movers' 'out-group hate' on 17 and free-riding on the protective contributions of the other in-group members is still payoff 1 maximizing from the individual perspective because the intragroup public good dilemma 2 remains unchanged. Should first-movers' contribute to BETWEEN in SEQ-PREEMPTIVE-3 STRIKE, though, this could be explained by two motivations: either (1) the intention to 4 preemptively defend against absolute and relative harm caused by the out-group, or (2) the 5 desire to attack and harm the out-group without having to fear retaliation. To disentangle 6 these two motivations, we conducted a control condition SEQ-SECURE-STRIKE in which we 7 removed the second-movers' BETWEEN pool. Here, second-movers can only choose 8 between keeping points and contributing to WITHIN. Thus, first-movers do not have to fear 9 second-movers 'out-group hate' and should thus only contribute to BETWEEN if they 10 intended to harm the out-group without worrying about retaliation. 11
Participants and Design 12
In total, 216 students (131 male and 85 female) from various academic disciplines of a 13
German university participated in the experiment (MD age = 24, M age = 24.47, SD = 5.12). 14 Treatment of participants was in agreements with the ethical guidelines of the German 15
Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) and the German Psychological 16 Society (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Psychologie). All participants gave their written informed 17 consent to participate voluntarily and were assured that all statistical analyses and reports 18 would be anonymous. Decisions were incentivized. To avoid potential losses, participants 19 received an additional flat-fee of €4. On average, participants earned €7.40 in the 45-minute 20 experiment. 21
The sessions of 24 participants each were randomly assigned to one of five 22 experimental between-subjects conditions: SIM, SEQ-HATE, SEQ-LOVE, SEQ-23
PREEMPTIVE-STRIKE, and SEQ-SECURE-STRIKE. Because the sequential (SEQ) 24
conditions assign two roles randomly to participants (first-mover and second-mover), therewas one session assigned to SIM and there were two sessions assigned to each of the other 1 conditions in order to have 24 independent observations in each condition. One session was 2 filled with a research assistant, because one subject did not show up; the data of the assistant 3 were excluded from all analyses. 4
Procedures 5
Participants pre-registered for experimental sessions online (Greiner, 2004) . On arrival, 6 each person was randomly allocated to a cubicle. All the interactions and corresponding 7 decisions in the experiment were computer-mediated using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 8 2007) . Participants were given written instructions (see electronic supplementary material). 9
The experimenter read the instructions aloud. It was explained that each participant is 10 randomly assigned to a group of size n = 3 that is matched with another three-person group 11 (labeled the blue and the green group). In all conditions except SIM, each group was 12 randomly given either the role of the first-movers or the second-movers. Each participant was 13 endowed with e = 5 points (1 point = €0.50) and had to decide how to allocate these points 14 among three behavioral options (except in the SEQ-SECURE-STRIKE/second-mover 15 condition, where subjects only had two options). Allocations affected the personal outcome, 16 as well as the in-group and the out-group members' outcomes. In order to have an equal 17 amount of behavioral observations for each potential response pattern of second-movers 18 without deceiving participants, we used the strategy vector method (Selten, 1967) . 1 Neutral labels were used in the instructions, e.g., 'decision 1 making task', 'project A' (WITHIN pool), and 'project B' (BETWEEN pool), and there was 2 no use of potentially emotion-laden words like 'cooperation', 'competition', 'aggression' etc. 3 Participants could ask clarifying questions before the experiment started. To make sure that 4 they had understood the game structure properly, participants had to correctly answer some 5 test questions before making their allocation decision anonymously. Afterwards, participants 6 answered a post-experimental questionnaire, including demographics. At the end, each 7 participant received individual payoff information, and was paid in private. 8
Results 9
The dataset containing individual-level behavioral observations used for the following 10 analyses can be found in the electronic supplementary material. Although the results presented so far strongly support the hypothesis that spiteful 'out-2 group hate' increases as a response to the opponents' harmful acts, they do not answer the 3 question as to how conflicts start in the first place. We hypothesize that the desire to defend 4 the in-group is not only important for the participation in vindictive intergroup actions but 5 might also play a crucial role in motivating attacks in the form of preemptive strikes. 6 
